DRC’s cobalt exports contain unreported uranium – our study estimates the global nuclear risk

# DRC Cobalt Mines Export Undeclared Uranium, Raising Global Nuclear Proliferation Risks

Researchers have uncovered a hidden nuclear threat embedded in the Democratic Republic of Congo's cobalt supply chain. Uranium contamination in cobalt exports from DRC mines goes unreported by mining companies and undetected by border authorities, according to a new study. The undeclared uranium could theoretically yield enough fissile material for 600 to 1,500 nuclear weapons if processed, the researchers estimate.

The DRC dominates global cobalt production, controlling roughly 70 percent of the world's supply. Cobalt mining generates cobalt-uranium ore that companies typically separate during processing. The uranium component either gets stored, discarded, or sold separately. However, researchers found that some uranium leaves the country without official documentation or regulatory oversight, creating a blind spot in international nuclear monitoring systems.

This discovery exposes a significant gap in global nuclear nonproliferation frameworks. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tracks declared uranium flows and maintains safeguards at known nuclear facilities. But undeclared uranium from artisanal and small-scale mining operations, along with unreported extraction from industrial mines, escapes scrutiny. The DRC lacks robust regulatory infrastructure to monitor and control uranium export, and international buyers often receive cobalt shipments without uranium inventories being officially recorded.

The research matters because nuclear-armed states and non-state actors actively seek fissile material. Untracked uranium creates an acquisition pathway for actors seeking to develop or expand nuclear weapons programs. Countries like Iran have historically pursued uranium through indirect supply chains rather than direct procurement from known sources. A ton of uranium requires substantial processing to become weapons-grade material, but the sheer volume entering global markets undetected raises the statistical probability of diversion.

Electronics manufacturers, battery producers, and aerospace companies purchase DRC cobalt without inspecting uranium residue levels. No international standard currently requires cobalt importers to verify uranium purity or account for uranium waste streams. This regulatory vacuum persists because cobalt's commercial value dominates policy discussions, while the uranium byproduct receives minimal attention from governments and industry groups.

The study recommends several interventions. The IAEA should expand monitoring frameworks to include cobalt supply chains and artisanal mining regions in the DRC. Importing nations should establish verification protocols requiring cobalt suppliers to declare uranium content and residual quantities. The DRC government needs capacity-building support to implement export controls and conduct inspections at mining sites. Industry self-regulation through supply-chain transparency standards could incentivize companies to report uranium separately.

Implementation faces obstacles. The DRC's mining sector involves thousands of informal operations difficult to regulate centrally. International enforcement depends on cooperation from countries that may prioritize economic ties with the DRC over nonproliferation concerns. Manufacturers resist costly compliance measures that raise cobalt prices.

The cobalt-uranium connection illustrates how dual-use materials and overlooked supply chains create proliferation risks outside traditional nuclear commerce. As global demand for cobalt grows due to electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage, uranium exports could increase proportionally. Without policy intervention, the DRC's cobalt boom may inadvertently become a nuclear proliferation vector.